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Wage Dispersion in a Partially Unionized Labor Force 
 
Taking as our point of departure a model proposed by David Card (2001), we suggest new 
methods for analyzing wage dispersion in a partially unionized labor market. Card’s method 
disaggregates the labor population into skill categories, which procedure entails some loss of 
information. Accordingly, we develop a model in which each worker individually is assigned a 
union-membership probability and predicted union and nonunion wages. The model yields a 
natural three-way decomposition of variance. The decomposition permits counterfactual 
analysis, using concepts and techniques from the theory of factorial experimental design. We 
examine causes of the increase in U.K. wage dispersion between 1983 and 1995. Of the 
factors initially considered, the most influential was a change in the structure of remuneration 
inside both the union and nonunion sectors. Next in importance was the decrease in union 
membership. Finally, exogenous changes in labor force characteristics had, for most groups 
considered, only a small negative effect. We supplement this preliminary three-factorial 
analysis with a five-factorial analysis that allows us to examine effects from the wage-
equation parameters in greater detail. 
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 I. Introduction
In his in￿ uential analysis of a partially unionized labor force, David Card
(2001) pays close attention to the relationship between workers￿pay, their
levels of skill, and the likelihood of their being in a union.1 Now pay and
skill are unlikely to be independent of union membership. And if they are
dependent, it is important to understand the nature of this dependence in
investigating such issues as the extent to which deunionization contributes
to elevated wage inequality, or the notion that unions are relatively more
e⁄ective in raising wages at lower reaches of the wage distribution (see re-
spectively Card, 2001; Lewis, 1986).
Card (2001, p. 297) seeks to accommodate two speci￿c features of par-
tially unionized labor markets: ￿rst, unionization rates that vary across the
wage distribution, with disproportionate falls among lower-wage workers in
Britain and the United States in the 1980s; and, second, di⁄erences in the
relative wage e⁄ect of unions for di⁄erent skill groups. He is concerned to
point out how each tendency may upset the conclusions of analyses that
neglect the interrelationship between unionization and skill.
Card￿ s own approach targets the variance of the log-wage, which is an
attractive way to measure dispersion because di⁄erences in the log-wage are
unit-free and are therefore (like pay ratios) of direct economic meaning. Fur-
thermore, the variance lends itself to additive decompositions via the analy-
sis of variance, an obvious advantage it holds over other dispersion measures
such as the standard deviation, Gini coe¢ cient, and inter-quartile range. In
Card￿ s treatment, workers are split into discrete ￿ skill￿categories on the ba-
sis of the predicted nonunion wage. The law of total variance is then used
to decompose the total variance of the log-wage into the contributions from
each category. Within skill categories, a further decomposition is possible;
speci￿cally, into the contributions from union and nonunion membership. In
investigating a phenomenon such as deunionization, therefore, one can use
Card￿ s decompositions to accommodate the e⁄ect of deunionization rates
that di⁄er by skill level.
The motive for the present treatment is that we believe that there is
scope for enhancement of Card￿ s illuminating formulation of variance decom-
position, based on an alternative handling of his important ￿ skill￿variable.
1See also Card, Lemieux and Riddell (2004); Canal Dominguez and Rodriguez Gutierrez
(2004); DiPrete (2005); Freeman (2005); Checchi, Visser, and Van de Werfhorst (2007);
Addison, Bailey, and Siebert (2007).
1Speci￿cally, we shall argue that (i) Card￿ s variance decompositions based on
groups of workers in skill categories would be easier to interpret if conducted
at the level of individual workers; (ii) retaining individual-level information
about characteristics and ￿ skill￿would also facilitate a more accurate analy-
sis of wage variance, particularly if the characteristics vector (rather than
the scalar ￿ skill￿ ) were used to explain union-membership behavior; and, (iii)
rather than making ￿ skill￿depend only on the predicted nonunion wage, it
would be more natural to use a de￿nition of skill that is even-handed between
the union and nonunion sectors.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section II outlines the salient fea-
tures of Card￿ s analysis. Section III ampli￿es the proposals summarized
above, and explains why we see them as desirable. Section IV develops our
own model of wage dispersion in partially unionized labor forces, leading to
a natural three-way variance decomposition. Section V then deals with esti-
mation matters. Section VI analyzes the components of U.K. wage variance
in 1983 and 1995. Section VII shows how the three-way decomposition, allied
with factor-response techniques from the theory of experimental design, can
be used to investigate the causes of the variance increase identi￿ed earlier.
Section VIII concludes.
II. Card￿ s Model of a Partially Unionized La-
bor Force
The use of the analysis of variance for partially unionized labor forces was
pioneered by Freeman (1980, p. 19, equation [6]), using the so-called law of
total variance. The law states that if data fall into groups, then overall vari-
ance can be decomposed into the variance of the group means, plus the mean
of the group variances. A similar law applies to random variables. Suppose
that we are modeling the data by use of a random variable W representing
the log-wage; that there are two groups, unionized and nonunionized workers,
occupying proportions u and 1 ￿ u respectively of the labor force; and that
the ￿rst two moments of the two groups￿log-wages are given by (wu;vu) and
(wn;vn), respectively. Further, let v = V ar(W). Then the law tells us that
v = uv
u + (1 ￿ u)v
n + u(1 ￿ u)￿
2
w, (1)
where ￿w ￿ wu￿wn. The ￿nal, variance-of-group-means term is the variance
of a dichotomous random variable that equals wu with probability u, and wn
2with probability 1 ￿ u. One can of course alternatively obtain (1) directly
from the de￿nition of v.
Card￿ s model of wage dispersion can be seen as a far-reaching generaliza-
tion of the Freeman decomposition. But it does not con￿ne itself to observed
quantities. As noted by Card, Lemieux, and Riddell (2004, p. 521), it
can also be seen as an example of potential outcomes analysis (Angrist and
Krueger, 1999) in which one attempts to assign to each worker both a union
wage and a nonunion wage. Only one of these is observed, while the other
is estimated and used in counterfactual analysis ￿as, for instance, when we
ask what the wage structure would have been had some nonunion workers
instead belonged to the union sector.
The model presented by Card (2001, pp. 297-298) allocates workers to
categories c = 1;:::;K according to a variable called skill. An exogenously-
determined proportion u(c) of workers in skill category c are union members.
The log-wages of union workers within a given category are assumed uncor-
related, with identical expectations and variances. In an analysis of variance
we are interested only in the ￿rst two moments; for union worker i in cate-
gory c the log-wage has moments wu
i (c) ￿ (wu (c);vu (c)), where wu (c) and
vu (c) are the category mean and variance. We assume that the data are
numerous enough for the two moments to be calculated with precision. Sim-
ilar assumptions are made about nonunion workers, with the di⁄erence that
wn
i (c) ￿ (wn (c);vn (c)).
At this stage, skill seems exogenous. However, Card (2001, pp. 304-305)
recognizes that skill is partially determined by observed characteristics: ￿A
necessary ￿rst step ... is to de￿ne skill groups ... I divided workers into
observable groups based on their predicted wages in the nonunion sector
...￿ Consequently, there are two di⁄ering expected log-wages, at any rate
for nonunion workers in a given skill category; namely, the category mean
wn (c), and the prediction just mentioned. We might reconcile these by sup-
posing that the second wage prediction is accessible to researchers but not
to employers, who observe only the worker￿ s skill category.
Partitioning the data into skill categories allows Card to investigate how
the expectation and variance of the log-wage di⁄er across the categories. He
can attribute the variance of the log-wage to components from all of the skill
categories and both sectors (union and nonunion). In Card￿ s (2001, p. 298)
analysis, the law of total variance yields the ￿rst line of his equation (3),
namely
v = V ar[w(c)] + E [v (c)], (2)
3where w(c) and v (c) are the category means and variances. Noting that
each skill category contains both union and nonunion members, he obtains
further decompositions. We can write w(c) as the weighted mean, as follows
w(c) = u(c)w
u (c) + (1 ￿ u(c))w
n (c) (3)
= w
n (c) + u(c)￿w (c),
where u(c) is union coverage in category c, and ￿w (c) ￿ wu (c) ￿ wn (c).
By a second application of the law of total variance we can decompose the
within-category variance v (c) into the Freeman-like form
v (c) = u(c)v
u (c) + (1 ￿ u(c))v
n (c) + u(c)(1 ￿ u(c))￿w (c)
2 . (4)
By combining the three expressions above, we arrive at Card￿ s culminat-
ing variance decomposition
v = v
n + V ar[u(c)￿w (c)] + 2Cov [w
n (c);u(c)￿w (c)] (5)
+E [u(c)￿v (c)] + E
￿





n = V ar[w
n (c)] + E [v
n (c)]. (6)
The decomposition (5) shows the dependence of variance on the structure
of union density u(c) across the skill levels. This is particularly important
when we ask how v might change if the level of unionization changed. Suppose
(to take an example similar to those discussed in section VII below) we ask
what v would have been in a given year had overall rates of unionization
been similar to those obtaining in some other year. The distinctive feature
of Card￿ s approach is that the use of skill categories in (5) allows him to
produce estimates of this counterfactual v that pay attention to the di⁄ering
rates of deunionization across the di⁄erent skill categories2.
2Equations (2) to (5) are the fundamental elements of Card￿ s analysis. However, he
also discusses a particular departure from them in referring to ￿unobserved heterogeneity,￿
which was a key concern in his earlier investigation (Card, 1996) of union impact on the
structure of wages. As Card (2001, p. 299) describes the problem: ￿The preceding formulas
have to be modi￿ed slightly if the union and nonunion workers in a given skill category
have di⁄erent productivity levels and would earn di⁄erent wages even in the absence of
unions. Such a phenomenon will arise if workers have productivity characteristics that
are known to employers but not fully captured in the observed skill categories, and if the
mean level of these unobserved skills is di⁄erent between union and nonunion workers in
a given skill group.￿
4III. Some Developments of Card￿ s Model
We now elaborate the points listed in section I, suggesting that the model is
capable of further re￿nement. Speci￿cally, we shall claim the following.
Card￿ s variance decompositions based on groups of workers in skill cat-
egories would be easier to interpret if conducted at the level of individual
workers. Card￿ s important decomposition (2), based on the law of total vari-
ance, is a striking and fundamental feature of his model, but its meaning
for the dispersion of wages is hard to interpret. The problem is that the
decomposition varies with respect to the arbitrary number of categories K
(which Card takes equal to 10). As K increases, the categories narrow and
the within-category variances decrease correspondingly. Consequently, vari-
ance is transferred in an uninformative way from the second term to the ￿rst
on the right-hand side of (2). One can contrast this situation with a more
economically meaningful decomposition such as that of Freeman (1), whose
partitioning is informative because the union and nonunion sectors, unlike
skill quantiles, are economically signi￿cant and autonomous entities.
To transmute (2) into a more informative equation, we suggest replacing
skill groups with individual workers. Thus K becomes equal to the sample
size N. This restores signi￿cance to (2), which now allows us to analyze total
variance into economically meaningful components: within-worker variance
and across-worker variance. Of course, skill ￿ groups￿containing one worker
each raise numerous problems. These are dealt with in the next section.
Retaining individual-level information about characteristics and ￿ skill￿would
also facilitate a more accurate analysis of wage variance, particularly if the
characteristics vector (rather than the scalar ￿ skill￿) were used to explain
union-membership behaviour. Predicted log-wages provide information at
the interval-scale level of information.3 Using categories as an alternative is
cruder, although one might adopt them in a preliminary study or for rea-
sons of convenience or necessity. The problem we face is that of assigning a
nonunion wage to union workers (or vice versa), so as to be able to perform a
counterfactual analysis. With the help of skill categories, we could measure
the e⁄ect of a shift in union coverage by assuming that if a worker leaves a
union, the new wage earned will be distributed like that of nonunion workers
in the same skill category (subject to modi￿cations in the case of unobserved
3See Stevens (1946) for a discussion of levels of measurement and, for criticisms of his
typology, Velleman and Wilkinson (1993).
5heterogeneity). However, replacing skill by two expected wages (union and
nonunion) provides a more sensitive means of dealing with deunionization.
The counterfactual wage is then predicted using all available information
about the worker, not just his or her skill category and union status.
As Freeman￿ s equation (1) shows, an important aspect of wage variance
is union density. How this is determined is an important aspect of any model
of wage variance in a partially-unionized labor force. Card, Lemieux, and
Riddell (2004, p. 522) state: ￿One starting point is the assumption that
union status ￿ is as good as randomly assigned,￿conditional on observed skill
characteristics.￿ And this starting point is in fact the one adopted in Card
(2001). However, it seems more probable that within each skill category,
some union and nonunion members will be likelier than others to leave or
join a union when conditions change. We should take such factors into ac-
count when predicting the resulting counterfactual distribution of log-wages.
Accordingly, in investigating the e⁄ect of deunionization on wage dispersion,
one should be as careful in modeling the causes of union membership as in
deriving its e⁄ects.
In our own model, following Dinardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996), we
explain union membership by means of a probit model, allowing us to assign a
union-membership probability to each individual worker. Then, for example,
in addressing the deunionization that took place in Britain between 1983 and
1995, we can investigate how much the wage variance would have increased
in the absence of deunionization, by applying the 1983 probit coe¢ cients
to 1995 workers and estimating the resulting variance. In fact, we shall
consider a number of counterfactual scenarios, in a systematic way, using
methods from the theory of experimental design.
The point about using all available information is relevant to the prob-
lem of unobserved heterogeneity (Card, 2001, pp. 299-300). Discussion of
unobserved heterogeneity is di¢ cult in the context of Card￿ s model precisely
because of the deletion of information that takes place when worker i is as-
signed to a skill category, and his or her characteristics zi are discarded. It
could be that relatively productive nonunion workers tend to be bunched
towards the top of a given skill category, while relatively unproductive union
members are bunched towards the bottom. This bunching could happen sim-
ply because of the workers￿spread of characteristics zi, and hence be fully
explicable within the model if only we made use of the available information4.
4This is not to say that the problem of unobserved heterogeneity is easily overcome.
6Rather than making ￿ skill￿depend only on the predicted nonunion wage,
it would be more natural to use a de￿nition of skill that is even-handed be-
tween the union and nonunion sectors. It seems desirable to treat union and
nonunion workers symmetrically, rather than de￿ning the important skill
variable as the predicted nonunion wage. We propose an even-handed ap-
proach: to de￿ne skill as a worker￿ s expected wage, unconditional on his or
her union status. To compute this expected wage we need to know his or
her union-membership probability, which can be obtained as ￿tted values
from the previously mentioned probit analysis. We also need to know the
worker￿ s expected union and nonunion wages. These can in turn be obtained
as predicted values from separate regression analyses of union and nonunion
wages.
IV. A Two-Wage Model
Proceeding in the manner suggested, we now present a model in which the
number of skill categories K in e⁄ect equals the number of workers N. Thus,
the part of w(c) is played by wi, the unconditional expectation of Wi, the
log-wage of worker i. In what follows we shall abbreviate ￿ log-wage￿as ￿ wage.￿




. Accordingly, (2) is re-
placed by the more transparent
v = V ar(wi) + E (vi), (7)
in which the variance and expectation are now taken over worker-subscripts
i rather than over category indices c. We call wi ￿ skill￿ , which is thus syn-
onymous with ￿ expected wage￿ . Thus we may read (7) as
{Total variance} = {Variance of across-worker skill}
+ {Average within-worker variance}
As Card notes (2001, p. 300), longitudinal data on union status changers could be used
to evaluate the wage gains of union joiners and the wage losses of union leavers (see, for
example, Lemieux, 1992; Card, 1996). Longitudinal studies observing the same workers in
both union and nonunion contexts provide evidence that the log-wages of union workers
that transfer to the nonunion sector do indeed di⁄er systematically from predictions of
their wages formed on the basis of observed characteristics alone. But our point is that the
e⁄ect, although real, will be over-stated if we fail to exploit the explanatory power residing
in the workers￿characteristics zi, which are necessary for a satisfactory counterfactual
analysis.
7Since our skill categories contain exactly one worker each, we cannot
follow Card (2001) in estimating wi and vi from quantile data. Instead, we
must analyze the dependence of the wage on union membership and skill in
a more detailed way. Our model for the way in which Wi is generated is
Wi = UiW
u












where Ui is a dichotomous random variable indicating union membership or
otherwise, and W u
i and W n
i are the worker￿ s union and nonunion wages, only
one of which is observed. Thus, Ui equals 1 with probability ui and Ui equals
0 with probability 1 ￿ ui. The union membership probability ui depends
on i￿ s characteristics vector zi. Hence, ui = E (Uijzi). The value wu
i is the
expected union wage for this worker, wu
i = E (WijUi = 1;zi). The deviation
"u
i from this value re￿ ects unobserved factors and random variation. We
assume that "u
i ￿ (0;vu
i ). Similarly, wn
i = E (WijUi = 0;zi), "n
i ￿ (0;vn
i ).
An e⁄ect of our observing only one wage is that the degree of association
between "u
i and "n
i plays no part in the variance analysis that follows; we can
and do leave it unspeci￿ed. We assume that Ui is uncorrelated with both "u
i
and "n
i . Our version of (3) is therefore
wi = E (Wijzi) = uiw
u




i + ui￿w;i, (8)
where ￿w;i = wu
i ￿ wn
i is the ￿ wage gap￿(the di⁄erence between the individ-
ual￿ s expected union and nonunion wages), and wu
i and wn
i are functions of
zi. We can now see the di⁄erence between Card￿ s skill, which corresponds to
our wn
i , and our own measure wi.
As regards the worker￿ s wage variance conditional on zi, we obtain the
Freeman-like relation
vi = V ar(Wijzi) = uiv
u
i + (1 ￿ ui)v
n
i + ui (1 ￿ ui)￿
2
w;i, (9)
where the conditional variances vu
i and vn
i are again functions of zi. The ￿rst
two terms together equal expected residual variance, while the ￿nal term
is the variance deriving from uncertainty about the worker￿ s union status.
Accordingly, the equation can be read {Variance of i￿ s wage} = {expected
residual variance for i} + {wage gap variance for i}. Combining (7) and (9),
and re-ordering the terms, we obtain a fundamental three-way decomposition
of the variance of the wage, namely
v = V ar(wi) + E
￿






i + (1 ￿ ui)v
n
i ], (10)
8in which the ￿rst term relates to across-worker skill di⁄erences, the second
to the wage gap, and the third to the residual error terms "u
i and "n
i . Thus
we may think of (10) as decomposing total variance v in an economically
informative way as
v = {across-worker skill variance}
+ {within-worker wage-gap variance}
+ {within-worker expected residual variance}. (11)
Card￿ s mean and variance decompositions remain true in our model, ex-
cept that his skill categories c are replaced by worker indices i. For example,
Card￿ s (2001) major formula, (5) above, is easy to modify in this way. In
doing so, let us introduce notation ￿i ￿ ui￿w;i = wi ￿ wn
i for the quantity
conventionally described as union power, namely the extent to which the
worker￿ s expected wage (his or her skill, in our terms) exceeds his or her
expected nonunion wage, both wages being conditional on characteristics zi.
We then obtain
v = V ar[wi] + E [vi]
= V ar[w
n















i ] + E [ui￿v;i] + E
￿





where moments are now computed across workers i.
Card (2001, p. 305) uses his decompositions to illustrate the di⁄ering
levels and e⁄ects of unionization across the skill levels. Thus, for example, his
Table 4 shows how union membership u(c), mean wage gap wu (c) ￿ wn (c),
and mean variance gap vn (c) ￿ vu (c) are related to skill category c.5 In
general, however, it is more illuminating to plot such graphs using on the
horizontal axis the interval-scale information present in our ￿ skill￿wi rather
than the merely ordinal information present in the category number c. Doing
so requires kernel-density techniques that we develop in the Appendix.
5Similar information is presented in Addison, Bailey, and Siebert (2007), Figures 1 and
3, pp. 344-345.
9V. Estimation of the Model
Given the information on Ui;Wi;zi in the data set, our model requires us to
estimate the quantities ui;wu
i ;wn
i ;vu
i , and vn
i for each worker. In doing so,
we make two convenient although inessential assumptions. The ￿rst of these
is that the regressors in respect of union membership Ui are the same as the
regressors for the log-wage Wi, namely the zi in both cases. One might seek
separate and more parsimonious speci￿cations for each regression; but with
labor force data there are typically enough observations to make this e⁄ort
unnecessary.
Our second assumption relates to the variances vu
i and vn
i . In describing
his regression procedures allowing for di⁄erences across skill groups, Card
(2001, pp. 304-305) assumes homoskedasticity of individual workers, and
we do likewise. Thus, our second assumption is that all vu
i equal the same
value ￿2
u, and all vn
i equal the same value ￿2
n. (We note parenthetically that
Card￿ s vu (c) and vn (c) do vary across skill categories. However, these quan-
tities cannot be interpreted as wage variances conditional on a given level of
skill since, as already noted, when we increase the number of categories K a
worker￿ s particular vu (c) and vn (c) decrease, as the corresponding category
ranges shrink. Consequently, the assumption of log-wage homoskedasticity
within the union sector, conditional on characteristics zi, does not contra-
dict heterogeneity of the vu (c). The same applies with respect to nonunion
workers and the vn (c).)
Based on these two modeling decisions, our procedure is as follows. First,
for all workers in the sample run a probit regression of Ui on zi, yielding
￿tted probabilities ^ ui. Second, for union workers only (Ui = 1), regress Wi
on zi, yielding estimated union wage coe¢ cients ^ ￿
u
, and also an estimated
union variance ^ ￿
2





for all workers, union and nonunion. Third, repeat the
operation for nonunion workers only, allowing us to predict a nonunion wage
^ wn
i for all workers, with an associated variance ^ ￿
2
n. The estimated quantities
^ ui; ^ wu
i ; ^ wn
i ; ^ vu
i = ^ ￿
2
u; ^ vn
i = ^ ￿
2
n can now be used to estimate the decomposition
(10).
In subsequent sections we will apply the above techniques to data for the
U.K. labor force. The information on earnings, unionization, and individual
characteristics, and our rationale for choosing them, are described in detail in
Addison, Bailey, and Siebert (2007, pp. 339-341). The 1983 data come from
the General Household Survey (GHS) of that year, the only year in which
10the GHS included a union membership question. In selecting the 1983 GHS
we make the same choice as have other scholars, including Machin (1997),
Bell and Pitt (1998), and Gosling and Lemieux (2001). For 1995 we choose
the Labour Force Survey of that year. By 1995 the U.K. union movement￿ s
fortunes had declined sharply from a ￿ golden age￿of unionism to which 1983
belonged. The contrast between the two years thus provides an intriguing
natural experiment for observers concerned with the factors, including union
density, that a⁄ect wage dispersion.
(Figures 1 and 2 near here)
Figure 1 ((a) through (e)) provides a smoothed version of the dichotomous
union-membership indicator variable Ui, plotted against centered skill wi￿ ￿ w
in our two comparator years. The point of the centering is to remove the e⁄ect
of changes in the general wage level across the two years. (For Card, this
removal is e⁄ected by his use of categories, which are perforce una⁄ected by
the general wage level.) In similar fashion Figure 2 plots the union-nonunion
wage gap ￿w;i against centered skill.
Figure 1 shows that, for most groups of full-time workers, unionization is
highest at intermediate levels of skill, tending both to decrease in slope and
￿ atten out in the transition from 1983 to 1995. For its part, Figure 2 shows,
again for most groups, a strong negative correlation between skill and the
wage gap, pointing to a seemingly strong incentive to belong to a union at
low skill levels. Similar qualitative features are found both in Card￿ s wage-
gap graphs (Card, 2001, p. 312, Figures 3, 4) and in Addison, Bailey, and
Siebert (2007, p. 344). For private-sector workers the wage-gap curve tends
to shift downward in the later year.
The exception to these generalizations is provided by public-sector fe-
males, whose union density increases with skill, a relationship that strength-
ens across the two years. Striking also is the change in this group￿ s wage-gap
curve between 1983 and 1995, which uniquely among the wage-gap curves
even shows a strong positive relationship to skill in 1995 among skilled work-
ers. One might hypothesize from Figures 1(e) and 2(e) that some change
between 1983 and 1995 increased the union premium sharply for high-skilled
public-sector females, and that this had a causal e⁄ect on the willingness of
these workers in to join a union. In section VII we will see that the e⁄ect
of deunionization is quite di⁄erent for public-sector females than for other
groups in the sample.
11VI. Decomposition of U.K. Log-Wage Variance
in 1983 and 1995
In section VII we will discuss the contribution of deunionization and other
factors to the increase in U. K. wage dispersion between 1983 and 1995, for
various sub-groups. The counterfactual methodology adopted will depend
heavily on the three-way variance decomposition (10), and estimation of the
associated parameters. In the present section we illustrate the necessary
techniques, using as an example the log-wage of the private-sector male sub-
group.
The ￿rst estimation task is to conduct a probit analysis of union mem-
bership for this group, so as to obtain a union-membership probability for
each worker in 1985 and 1993. Changes in these equations and associated
worker characteristics determine the union density contribution to changes
in wage dispersion. As a measure of our level of success in explaining
union membership we use Efron￿ s (1978) pseudo-R2, de￿ned as R2
E = 1 ￿
￿(Ui ￿ ^ ui)
2 =￿(Ui ￿ u)
2, where u is the actual union density and ^ ui is the
probit estimate of worker i￿ s union membership probability. In other words
R2
E indicates the explanatory power of the probit model, compared with the
model that assigns the same probability u = ￿ U to all workers.
Following Addison, Bailey, and Siebert (2007, p. 341) (see also Card
2001, p. 305) the regressors used (i.e. the components of the characteristics
vector zi) in both the probit analysis and the regression analyses are: years
of education and years of experience, and their second, third, and fourth
powers; interaction between experience and education; interaction between
experience and experience-squared; as well as dichotomous variables indicat-
ing whether or not workers are white, married, and employed by small ￿rms,
together with ￿ve regional, eight occupational, and nine industry dummies.
Details of the probit analyses for the private-sector male group years appear
in Table 1.
(Table 1 near here)
Table 1 shows for this group a conventional pattern of union membership
determinants, with the main change over the two years con￿ned to the occu-
pation dummies. Thus, the coe¢ cient estimates for labor market experience
are well determined throughout in both years: in general, rising experience
translates into a greater probability of union membership, as usual. Another
12well established result is the relationship between ￿rm size and unionization:
in both years, workers in small ￿rms are less likely to be unionized than their
counterparts in larger enterprises. But neither race nor marital status appear
to be in￿ uential. The occupational dummies show blue-collar occupations to
be more unionized in both years, but generally the coe¢ cients are smaller.
Coe¢ cients tend also to become smaller over time for the industry dummies.
Below, we will ￿nd these changes to be variance-increasing. There has been
a movement of private-sector males towards the less-unionized white-collar
categories, and the blue-collar categories themselves show smaller coe¢ cients
in the union probit. However, as our calculations below will show, these ef-
fects are quite small for the private-sector male group, although larger for
other sub-groups such as public-sector females.
The next step is to run a least-squares regression of the log-wage on worker
characteristics for the union sector, and to use the estimated coe¢ cients ￿
u
to predict an expected union wage for every worker ￿union and nonunion.
Then, we need to run a similar regression for the nonunion sector, and use
the resulting coe¢ cients ￿
n to predict a nonunion wage for every worker.
(Results of these exercises for private-sector males, and indeed all nine worker
groups, are available from the authors on request.) The estimated residual
variances ^ ￿
2
u and ^ ￿
2
n from these two ￿tted regressions are interesting in that
both increase across the two years, ^ ￿
2
u by 22 percent (from 0.099 to 0.121) and
^ ￿
2
n by 30 percent (from 0.125 to 0.162). This increase suggests already that
deunionization may not be the sole cause of the increase in wage dispersion,
since residual variance was increasing within each sector over the sample
period.
(Table 2 near here)
Table 2 illustrates the estimation of the three-way decomposition for the
entire labor force in each of our two chosen years. From the last line of the
table, which gives the variance of the log-wage in 1983 and 1995, observe
the 34 percent increase in this value (from 0.221 to 0.297) which provides
the motivation for the analysis in the preceding rows. (The question of the
extent to which this material increase in dispersion is connected with the 31
percent decrease in unionization observed over the same period is addressed
in section VII.)
Using the probit and regression analyses, we can estimate the components
of dispersion detailed in (10) and (11). As explained in section V, this exercise
13involves using the results from the probit and regression analyses to assign
a union-membership probability to each worker, and a union and nonunion
log-wage to each worker, as well as a variance to each of these log-wages.
One then treats the log-wages actually observed as a single draw from the
probability model. An important check on the model￿ s performance is to
determine how close its predicted variance (a sum of three components) is
to the actual variance. From the last two lines of the table it can be seen
that, for the labor force as a whole, the actual and predicted variance are
close to each other in each of the two years. Looking at the components
themselves for 1983, we see that the wage-gap variance ui (1 ￿ ui)￿2
w;i is
small in comparison with the other two components, although as the various
components of Figure 2 show, ￿w;i itself can be sizable.
(Table 3 near here)
Since the contribution of the union-nonunion gap variance is so small,
nearly all dispersion comes from the two other components, and in roughly
equal amounts. Table 3 shows that similar percentages ￿ approximately
50:0:50 ￿hold in subgroups of the labor force. Comparing the model pre-
dictions of variance ^ vtot and the actual variances vact, shown in the last two
columns of the table, note that the two magnitudes tend to be closer in
1983 than in 1995, and closer in the private sector than the public sector.
The agreement between the two is generally good: of the eighteen groups
considered in Table 3, j^ vtot ￿ vactj exceeds 0.004 only for the three smallest:
public-sector males in 1995, and public-sector females in both 1983 and 1995.
VII. An Analysis of the Increase in U.K. Wage
Dispersion Between 1983 and 1995
Suppose that we are supplied with a set of union-membership probit coe¢ -





a data set of worker characteristics Z = (z1;:::;zN). Then, the three-way
decomposition (10) yields a value
v = v (￿; ;Z) (12)
for the variance of the log-wage. Notice that v is population variance (a
constant), not sample variance (a random variable). It can be thought of
14as the average wage variance from an in￿nite sequence of replications of the
model, if we were able to set up identical labor forces and labor markets
in many di⁄erent worlds. Using the language of the theory of experimental
design, we can think of ￿,  , and Z as ￿ factors￿or ￿ treatments￿in￿ uencing
the ￿ response￿variable ^ v. We now attempt to say how important each factor
was in explaining the actual increase in wage variance v1995 ￿ v1983, taking
into account the non-linearity of the relation (12).
Methodologies for doing so are suggested in the experimental design lit-
erature; see, for example, Cox and Reid (2000); Box, Hunter, and Hunter
(2005); Morgan and Winship (2007). A useful brief survey of terminology
and methods is provided by Li, Sudarsanam, and Frey (2006). The way these
ideas are applied in the present section are as follows. The model (12) pro-
vides a deterministic relationship between the model inputs and the model￿ s
response variable, log-wage variance. The theory of experimental design is
helpful (even though experimental error is absent from (12)) because it is
particularly concerned with the application of several di⁄ering ￿ treatments￿ ,
each at two levels conventionally called ￿ low￿and ￿ high￿(in our case, ￿ low￿
corresponds to 1983, ￿ high￿to 1995; the ￿ treatments￿themselves will be de-
scribed shortly). Moreover, as we now show, experimental design￿ s concept
of the ￿ main e⁄ect￿proves a valuable means of addressing the index num-
ber problem of deciding at which level (1983 or 1995) to hold the di⁄erent
explicative factors, when we undertake counterfactual analysis.
Let us denote the 1983 and 1995 settings of ￿,  , and Z by the subscripts
0 and 1, respectively. Write ^ v101, for instance, to mean v
￿
^ ￿1995; ^  1983;Z1995
￿
.
Thus, ^ v101 can be interpreted as the predicted counterfactual log-wage vari-
ance if probit coe¢ cients and worker characteristics are held at their 1995
levels, but wage equation parameters assume their 1983 levels. We can cal-
culate all eight predictions ^ v000; ^ v001;:::; ^ v111 using (10). Thus the three
￿ treatments￿can be applied at any combination of ￿ high￿and ￿ low￿settings,
and the size of the resultant ￿ response￿can be measured in each case.
The ￿ e⁄ect￿of a factor is its impact (however measured) on the response
variable. In particular, the ￿ main e⁄ect￿of a factor is de￿ned in the literature
as the average value of the responses when the factor is at its high setting,
minus the average value when it is at its low setting. For example, the main




(^ v100 + ^ v101 + ^ v110 + ^ v111) ￿
1
4
(^ v000 + ^ v001 + ^ v010 + ^ v011)
15with corresponding expressions for the main e⁄ect from the wage equations,
ME , and the main e⁄ect from characteristics, MEZ. The sum of the three
main e⁄ects in general di⁄ers from both the actual variance increase v1995 ￿
v1983 and the ￿tted increase ^ v1995 ￿ ^ v1983. However, if the model is a good
one and if (a separate point) the response is a roughly linear function of the
three factors, we obtain
v1995 ￿ v1983 ’ ME￿ + ME  + MEZ (’ ^ v1995 ￿ ^ v1983). (13)
As Table 4 shows, the approximation (13) does in fact hold up well in
the wage-variance context (for instance, for private-sector males the sum of
the main e⁄ects is 0.077, while the actual increase in the variance of the log
wage is 0.076) allowing us to use (13) to estimate the comparative e⁄ects of
changes in the three factors, on wage dispersion.
(Table 4 near here)
The labor force as a whole and nearly all subgroups display the same pat-
tern. Most of the variance increase is attributable to  , that is, to changes
in the coe¢ cients and residual variances of the two wage equations. Less
important are changes in the union probit coe¢ cients ￿. Least in￿ uential
of all are changes in exogenous worker characteristics factor Z, whose im-
pact is both small and negative for the majority of subgroups. This last
result means that if the union probit coe¢ cients and wage parameters were
held constant, changes in worker characteristics would have caused a small
decrease in dispersion. As might have been expected from the graphs in
section VI, public-sector females prove an anomalous group. For these work-
ers, the main e⁄ects from changes in the probit and wage parameters are
particularly large, relatively speaking, while the main e⁄ect from changes in
characteristics is large and negative. These aspects of public-sector females
have a clear in￿ uence on the public sector as a whole.
Public-sector females became more homogeneous over the period, which
explains the negative e⁄ect of changes in characteristics for their wage dis-
persion. To understand in greater detail why this is so, we examined the
wage regressions for this groups of workers. The regressions showed that a
key variable a⁄ecting wage was years of education, whose variance for this
group fell from 5.24 to 3.91. In contrast, the variance of years of education
for private-sector females rose from 1.94 to 3.23, and for this group the main
e⁄ect from changes in characteristics was positive.
16The preliminary factorial analysis undertaken in Table 4 suggests direct-
ing closer attention to the wage-equation parameters  , the most active of





as four separate factors, and (following common practice in factorial experi-
ments) combine the relatively unimportant factors ￿ and Z into a ￿fth factor,
￿ other￿ , thus obtaining a 26￿1 design based on the thirty-two predicted re-
sponses ^ v00000,...,^ v11111. The results from the new counterfactual experiment
are shown in Table 5.
(Table 5 near here)
For public-sector workers one would expect the combined e⁄ect of changes
in the union parameters ￿2
u and ￿
u to outweigh the combined e⁄ect of changes
in the nonunion parameters ￿2
n and ￿
n, and this is borne out in Table 5,
with as expected the reverse result for private-sector workers. Nonetheless,
changes in the non-union residual wage variance factor ￿2
n accounts for a
sizeable proportion of changes in the wage variance (v1995 ￿ v1983) for all
groups, public and private, except public-sector males. In six of the nine
cases, it turns out to be the most important factor in the variance increase6.
We also see that changes in the coe¢ cients ￿
u and ￿
n from the wage equations
always contribute positively to v1995 ￿ v1983. This e⁄ect means that the
wage coe¢ cients have increased in magnitude over time, pushing dispersion
upwards. The coe¢ cients ￿ from the union-membership probit equations
also have a positive contribution. This e⁄ect, by contrast, arises from the
union coe¢ cients becoming smaller in magnitude, which in turn prompts a
fall in union density and a migration of union workers to the more dispersed
nounion sector.
6The table provides checks of the decisions made above about our choice of factors. As
in Table 4, the ￿rst two columns show that the sum of the main e⁄ects for each group
is close to the actual v1995 ￿ v1983 for the group. Comparing MEU + MEZ (from Table
4) with the main e⁄ect of ￿ other￿in Table 5, we ￿nd that the absolute di⁄erence between
the two exceeds one percent only in the case of private-sector males, for whom it is two
percent (10.6 percent minus 1.8 percent, versus 6.8 percent). It appears that there is little
interaction between ￿ and Z. In other words, combining them in order to reduce the
number of factors has done little harm.
17VIII. Conclusion
We have developed a two-wage model of wage dispersion in a partially-
unionized labor force, in which dispersion is decomposed into explicable fac-
tors and residual variation. The residual component is minimized by treating
union membership as endogenous and therefore partially explained by worker
characteristics. Each worker has a union membership probability, a predicted
union wage and residual variance, and a predicted nonunion wage and resid-
ual variance. We used the law of total variance to obtain a natural three-way
decomposition of log-wage variance based on these quantities.
We then used the three-way decomposition in a counterfactually-based
analysis of the increase in U. K. wage dispersion that occurred between 1983
and 1995. The analysis employed concepts and methods from the theory of
experimental design. We found that the main factor in the increase in dis-
persion was a change in the patterns of remuneration within the union and
nonunion sectors. The decline in union membership made a smaller contri-
bution, roughly one-quarter as large. The third factor considered, exogenous
changes in worker characteristics, had only a small ￿and usually negative ￿
e⁄ect compared with that of the other two factors, indicating a decline in the
dispersion of characteristics, and in particular a decline in the dispersion of
education. In view of the large contribution from the wage equation, we split
the wage e⁄ect into four factors, combining the union and characteristics
e⁄ects into ￿ other￿ . Except in the exclusively public-sector groups, we found
the largest factor in increasing wage variance to be an increase in the residual
variance of the nonunion wage equation, but with substantial supplementary
e⁄ects coming from increases in the coe¢ cients of the two wage equations.
Along with these numerical ￿ndings, the enabling material contributions
of this exercise include the two-wage model itself and the resulting three-way
variance decomposition; the bivariate kernel-density-based graphical tech-
niques elaborated in the Appendix; and the counterfactual experimental de-
sign methodology. These are versatile techniques for the analysis of wage
dispersion in partially unionized labor forces.
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20Appendix. The Presentation of Scatter Plots
as Functional Relationships.
Here we address an issue of graphical display. In Card￿ s (2001) framework,
it is easy to plot the relationship between the skill category c (on the hori-
zontal axis) and other statistics of interest, such as the proportion of workers
in a union u(c) or the union-nonunion gap ￿w (c). A natural alternative in
our framework would be to replace skill category c by worker skill wi, and
to plot scatter diagrams of Ui and ￿w;i against wi, where ￿w;i is the wage
gap wu
i ￿ wn
i . Such plots would however contain a large number of data
points, and fail to convey a clear impression of the statistical relationship be-
tween the two variables. For example, if union membership declined between
two comparator years, such shifts would be di¢ cult to detect in intermin-
gled scatter plots. In order to represent scatter-relationships by graphical
functional relationships, we employ techniques from the theory of bivariate
kernel-density smoothing.
We begin by stating our main results. Suppose that we have N pairs of
points (Xi;Yi). (Figures 1 and 2 present the examples Xi = wi (skill); and
Yi = Ui (union density) or Yi = ￿w;i (union-nonunion wage gap).) These are
used to construct a smooth bivariate distribution describing a pair of random
variables (X;Y ). Our strategy is to compute and plot E (Y jX = x) against
x, yielding a smooth nonlinear curve.






. De￿ne pi (x) = Ai (x)=A(x), where












The factor h controls the level of smoothness (high h) or detail (low h)
in the resulting graphs. A high N justi￿es a low choice of h. Following
experiment with the graphs￿appearance we set h = 20=
p
N, implying a
window width of about 0.6 standard deviations when N = 1000. Then (as
we shall explain)











21To see how these results are derived, it is helpful ￿rst to consider uni-
variate smoothing. Given a sequence X1;:::;XN of scalar observations, one
constructs a density function fX whose graph provides similar information to
a spike graph or a histogram of the observations, but has the advantages of
being smooth, and (in common with the two-wage model itself) of being in-
dependent of any choice of bins. Thus kernel-density smoothing constructs a
density function fX that may be regarded as an approximation to the density
function generating the Xi. However a useful alternative perspective is that
fX describes the exact distribution of a constructed random variable X that
we generate by adding a random perturbation to the empirical distribution of
the Xi. This random perturbation levels out the spike-graph of the empirical
distribution into a smooth density function. In detail, the construction of
fX is as follows. First, de￿ne the random integer I by equiprobable choice
from the population f1;:::;Ng. Second, de￿ne X ￿ XI +￿, where ￿ is some
suitably chosen random perturbation, which we take to be independent of I,
although this is not essential. Third, compute the density fX of the random
variable X. This density may now be plotted.
To complete the speci￿cation of fX we must choose a density function
f￿, known as the kernel density function, for ￿. A tractable choice for the
kernel density is ￿ ￿ N (0;h2s2
X), where hsX is called the window width
of the process, and s2
X is the sample variance of the Xi. The choice of
smoothing parameter h is a compromise between the con￿ icting requirements
of smoothness (large h, near 1, say) and detail (small h) in the resulting
density graph.
All this can be generalized to the case where, instead of scalars Xi, we
have bivariate vectors Qi ￿ (Xi;Yi). Now the joint density fQ takes two
arguments. The perturbation ￿ becomes a bivariate random vector, whose
distribution has to be speci￿ed. Once this is done we can de￿ne Q = QI +￿
and compute the bivariate density fQ (x;y). So far this is a straightforward
extension of scalar smoothing. However, with a bivariate distribution we can
obtain the conditional distribution of Y given X: this conditional distribution
exists because f￿ and fQ are density functions in their own right, as discussed
above. From fQ we can compute the conditional distribution fY jX (yjX = x)
and hence the conditional expectation E (Y jX = x). Finally, we can plot
E (Y jX = x) against x. This is our method for turning the scatter plot of,
say, (wi;Ui) into an informative functional relationship that can be plotted
as a single curve.
It is important that the perturbing distribution should be tractable, al-
22lowing us to compute analytically the e⁄ect of the conditioning information
X = x. Thus, a convenient choice of density for ￿ is the bivariate normal.
The conditional distributions are then also normal. The particular speci-








sample variance-covariance matrix of the Qi. Imposing such a distribution
on ￿ causes the elliptical contours of f￿ to be roughly aligned with the con-
tours suggested by a scatter plot of (Xi;Yi), although neither these nor the
contours of fQ are in general elliptical.7 For our actual choice of h see the
main body of the text.
In detail, the computation is as follows. To specify the joint distribution
of (X;Y ), start from the sequence (Xi;Yi) of N data pairs. A random integer
I is chosen as described above. Conditionally on the value I = i, (X;Y ) has



















The aim is to ￿nd and graph E (Y jX = x) against x, so we need the
distribution of Y conditional on X = x. According to the total probability
theorem, the density of this distribution is
fY jX (yjX = x) =
N X
k=1
fY jX;I (yjX = x;I = i)pi (x), (A.3)
where we de￿ne pi (x) ￿ P (I = ijX = x). The ￿rst factor on the right of
(A.3) can be obtained from (A.2) using the main result about the conditional
bivariate normal distribution, which here yields for the distribution of Y
conditional upon X = x and I = i















The second factor on the right of (A.3) can be obtained from Bayes￿
theorem, which yields
pi (x) = P (I = ijX = x) =
fXjI (xjI = i)P (I = i)
PN
k=1 fXjI (xjI = k)P (I = k)
: (A.4)
7On this natural choice of ￿, see Fukunaga (1972); Silverman (1984, pp. 77-8).









. Moreover P (I = i) = N￿1. If we re-
move the factor (2￿s2
X)
￿1=2 N￿1 common to all terms in the numerator and


















Now use (A.3) and (A.4) to obtain E (Y jX = x). The ￿nal result is
E (Y jX = x) =
N X
k=1












as stated in section VI.
We note that the method also allows us to compute V ar(Y jX = x) and
hence to compute and plot con￿dence bounds about the curve of E (Y jX = x).
However, in order to keep the graphs uncluttered, these bounds have been
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Table 1. Probit Analysis of Union Membership of Private-Sector Males, 1983 and 1995. 
 
                 1983                                           1995 
   Coefficient   St. Err.   Coefficient   St. Err. 
Constant 











2  0.9666  3.05  -1.655  2.72 
SCHOOL
3  -0.03454  0.174  0.08849  0.154 
SCHOOL
4  0.0002617  0.00368  -0.001781  0.00323 
EXP (= years of 
experience) 
0.3289  0.0865***  0.1765  0.0852** 
EXP
2  -0.01478  0.00436***  -0.004587  0.00422 
EXP







EXP.SCHOOL  -0.009541  0.00528*  -0.006344  0.00562 
EXP
2.SCHOOL  0.0002035  0.000113*  0.0000533  0.000117 
White  -0.1466  0.144  0.2588  0.163 
Married  0.07417  0.0782  0.03005  0.0649 
Small firm  -0.7146  0.0655***  -0.5636  0.0678*** 
Region         
North  0.3613  0.0696***  0.2720  0.0662*** 
Midlands  0.1487  0.0757**  0.1770  0.0733** 
Wales  0.3405  0.141**  0.5250  0.139*** 











Associate professional  0.6942  0.126***  0.3970  0.104*** 
Clerical  0.4690  0.121***  0.4438  0.118*** 
Personal Service  0.3946  0.330  -0.4437  0.377 
Craft  1.088  0.0936***  0.6501  0.0817*** 
Operative  1.130  0.111***  0.5953  0.101*** 











Energy and Water Utilities  -0.3005  0.260  1.253  0.207*** 
Mining  0.1915  0.113*  0.08231  0.226 
Construction  -0.7905  0.0975***  -0.2936  0.105*** 
Distribution  -0.4729  0.0853***  -0.6704  0.0919*** 
Transport  0.03239  0.135  0.2607  0.0902*** 
Banking and Finance  0.1441  0.104  -0.1706  0.0792** 
Government  -0.2887  0.140*  0.3808  0.177** 
         
N                                                               2708              3057   
Efron Pseudo-R
2            0.285       0.209   
         
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy for union membership (=1, 0 otherwise). 
 ***, **, * indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 32 
 
 
Table 2. Computation of the Three-Way Variance Decomposition for U.K. Private-Sector 
Males, 1983 and 1995. 
  1983 
 
  1995   
         
Probit analysis of union membership         
Proportion unionized (actual)  0.427    0.296   
Proportion unionized (fitted)  0.429    0.297   
Efron Pseudo-R²  0.285    0.209   
         
Regression analysis         
Residual union variance  2
u σ   0.099    0.121   
Adjusted R², union sector  0.253    0.351   
Residual nonunion variance  2
n σ   0.125    0.162   
Adjusted R², nonunion sector  0.554    0.533   
         
Estimated variance decomposition         
Across-worker skill variance  0.104  (46.7%)    0.146  (48.8%) 
Within-worker, wage gap variance  0.004  (1.8%)  0.003  (1.0%) 
Within-worker, expected residual 
variance 
0.114  (51.5%)  0.150  (50.2%) 
Model estimate of total variance  0.222    0.299   
Actual total variance  0.221    0.297   
         












skill v ˆ  
 
gap v ˆ  
 
residual v ˆ  
 
total v ˆ  
 




1983  2708  0.104  0.004  0.114  0.222  0.221 
  1995  3057  0.146  0.003  0.150  0.299  0.297 
Public-Sector 
Males 
1983  1473  0.083  0.003  0.089  0.175  0.171 
  1995  933  0.102  0.006  0.099  0.207  0.198 
Private-Sector 
Females 
1983  1242  0.076  0.006  0.080  0.163  0.161 
  1995  1574  0.101  0.003  0.135  0.239  0.236 
Public-Sector 
Females 
1983  708  0.081  0.007  0.068  0.156  0.148 
  1995  883  0.089  0.008  0.089  0.186  0.180 
All Male 
Workers 
1983  4181  0.099  0.003  0.106  0.208  0.208 
  1995  3990  0.136  0.003  0.142  0.281  0.279 
All Female 
Workers 
1983  1950  0.096  0.006  0.078  0.180  0.180 
  1995  2457  0.108  0.005  0.121  0.233  0.233 
All Private-
Sector Workers 
1983  3950  0.129  0.005  0.121  0.254  0.254 
  1995  4631  0.145  0.003  0.161  0.309  0.308 
All Public-
Sector Workers 
1983  2181  0.092  0.003  0.094  0.189  0.185 
  1995  1816  0.099  0.004  0.111  0.209  0.213 
All Workers  1983  6131  0.121  0.004  0.113  0.239  0.238 
  1995  6447  0.133  0.003  0.150  0.286  0.286 
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Table 4. The Contribution of U, WE, and Z to the Increase in Wage Dispersion in the U.K., 1983 to 1995. 
Sector/Gender 
Actual increase in 
variance of the log-wage 
1983 1995 v v −  
Sum of Main Effects 
Z ME ME ME + + ψ γ
 
Main Effect from 
Changes in Union 
Probit Coefficients, 
γ ME  
Main Effect from Changes 
in the Union and Nonunion 
Wage Equations, 
ψ ME  
Main Effect from 
Changes in Worker 
Characteristics, 
Z ME  
Private-Sector Males  0.0759  0.0771  0.0082 (10.6%)  0.0703 (91.1%)  -0.0014 (-1.8%) 
Public-Sector Males  0.0267  0.0314  0.0055 (17.5%)  0.0288 (91.7%)  -0.0029 (-9.2%) 
Private-Sector 
Females  
0.0760  0.0759  0.0029 (3.8%)  0.0534 (70.3%)  0.0196 (25.8%) 
Public-Sector 
Females 
0.0312  0.0304  0.0102 (33.4%)  0.0332 (109.3%)  -0.0130 (-42.7%) 
All Male Workers  0.0714  0.0720  0.0119 (16.5%)  0.0535 (74.3%)  0.0066 (9.2%) 
All Female Workers  0.0529  0.0539  0.0100 (18.6%)  0.0411 (76.4%)  0.0027 (5.1%) 
All Private-Sector 
Workers 
0.0536  0.0537  0.0060 (11.2%)  0.0532 (99.0%)  -0.0055 (-10.2%) 
All Public-Sector 
Workers 
0.0236  0.0244  0.0087 (35.5%)  0.0232 (95.0%)  -0.0074 (-30.5%) 
All Workers  0.0473  0.0472  0.0118 (25.0%)  0.0409 (86.8%)  -0.0056 (-11.8%) 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 35 
 
Table 5. The Influence of Wage Equation Parameters on the Increase in Wage Dispersion in the U.K., 1983 to 1995. 
Sector/Gender 
Actual 




Effects   Main Effect from  2
u σ  
Main Effect from 
u β  
Main Effect from 
2
n σ  
Main Effect from 
n β  
Main Effect from 
Other Factors      
( Z , γ ) 
Private-Sector  Males  0.0759  0.0759  0.0081 (10.7%)  0.0167 (22.4%)  0.0236 (31.2%)  0.0223 (29.4%)  0.0051 (6.8%) 
               
Public-Sector Males  0.0267  0.0317  0.0014 (4.5%)  0.0163 (51.4%)  0.0043 (13.5%)  0.0070 (22.2%)  0.0027 (8.4%) 
               
Private-Sector  
Females 
0.0760  0.0765  0.0135 (17.7%)  0.0019 (2.5%)  0.0391 (51.2%)  -0.0006 (-0.8%)  0.0226 (29.5%) 
               
Public-Sector 
Females 
0.0312  0.0295  0.0114 (38.5%)  0.0178 (60.3%)  0.0074 (25.2%)  -0.0042 (-14.2%)  -0.0029 (-9.7%) 
               
All Male Workers  0.0714  0.0714  0.0090 (12.6%)  0.0131 (18.3%)  0.0186 (26.0%)  0.0130 (18.3%)  0.0178 (24.9%) 
               
All Female Workers  0.0529  0.0540  0.0118 (21.9%)  0.0142 (26.3%)  0.0275 (50.9%)  -0.0128 (-23.8%)  0.0133 (24.7%) 
               
All Private-Sector 
Workers 
0.0536  0.0537  0.0102 (18.9%)  0.0119 (22.2%)  0.0259 (48.2%)  0.0059 (11.1%)  -0.0002 (-0.3%) 
               
All Public-Sector 
Workers  
0.0236  0.0242  0.0042 (17.3%)  0.0100 (41.5%)  0.0087 (35.9%)  0.0000 (0.2%)  0.0013 (5.3%) 
               
All Workers  0.0473  0.0472  0.0096 (20.5%)  0.0096 (20.4%)  0.0205 (43.6%)  0.0013 (2.8%)  0.0060 (12.8%) 
               
 